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ABSTRACT
As the Internet becomes the pervasive background to so many of our cognitive activities, it moves beyond simply being a tool 
and becomes a new sort of cognitive ecology. Our deepening reliance upon it, reshapes many of our cognitive activities and this 
provokes profound changes in our sense of self and agency, even in who and what at we are as persons In the process we may be 
becoming Internet Extended Persons. This article uses some of the theoretical resources of 4E cognitive science to explore a central 
dilemma: What is the philosophical significance of these changes for us as persons? Should we view at least some Internet systems 
and applications as potential extensions of ourselves, both as persons and agents: as genuine extended selves, or, Exoselves? Or is 
it better to see the profiles and personalized systems as, merely appearing to contribute to our cognitive profile, but really under-
mining our sense of ourselves, our coherence, our agency, and perhaps ultimately our identity as persons? Might our interactions 
with the Internet really be creating dopplegangers rather than exoselves? This paper discusses the possibilities and constraints of 
the existence of exoselves and whether the Internet (or the Cloud) serves as a good substrate for extending persons.
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SECTION 1: INTERNET EXTENDED 
PERSONS AND THEIR COUNTERFEITS
The framework of Situated Cognition is a 
central strand of 4E cognitive science that emphasizes 
how cognition is not sequestered away in the head 
but routinely exploits structures in the natural, 
social and artefactual worlds as an intimate part of 
its functioning (Robbins & Aydede, 2009). Placing 
an emphasis on situated cognition in relationship 
to the human mind moreover foregrounds how 
many of our distinctive capacities are intimately 
bound up with our abilities to create, exploit and 
incorporate artefacts and ambient resources into our 
cognitive operations (Clark, 1997; Suchman, 1987; 
Vygotsky, 1978). These capacities emerge, not as 
direct outcomes of an inner processing structures, 
but from deep interactions with human cultural 
resources, including public representational systems 
(Gregory, 1981), social interpretative practices 
(Zawidzki, 2013) but also the deep background of 
material culture: tools and artefacts (Malafouris, 
2013). Although theoretical cognitive science 
has traditionally tended to downplay the role of 
artefacts and attendant practices in the constitution 
of our minds, this has recently started to change 
(Hutchins, 2010; Malafouris, 2008; Norman, 2000). 
Philosophical accounts have also started to grapple 
with how the human mind must be understood against 
the background or tools and artefacts upon which 
it constantly leans, or incorporates, in order to call 
forth its cognitive prowess (Clark, 2003; Donald, 
2001; Menary, 2014; Sutton, 2010). This article 
focuses on attempting to understand the nature of 
human person against this situated background. In 
particular, it seeks to understand how and whether 
being the persons we are is now partly constituted 
by our reliance on a rich milieu of Internet-mediated 
cognitive technologies, and if this is true, what it 
might mean for the human condition in the early 
21st century.
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From the situated perspective, it is only 
through our ongoing reliance on artefacts and tools 
that our distinct cognitive capacities are disclosed. 
This perspective provides context for recent claims 
that the Internet is transforming not just our media 
but what we are, our sense of self and even our sense 
of reality (Floridi, 2014). As the densely integrated 
artefactual environment is transformed, it should 
be no surprise that we are transformed with them 
(Clowes, 2015b, 2019). And, as an ever-increasing 
range of our cognitive operations have become 
involved with artefacts that present and mediate 
ICT technology, and especially the Internet, our 
cognitive abilities and perhaps our minds may be 
undergoing a rapid evolution (Smart, Clowes, & 
Heersmink, 2017)
The focus of this article is not so much on the 
nature of this new cognitive ecology, or even upon 
how it might be changing human cognition more 
generally1, but on what implications it might have 
for who we are. The major claim I will focus on 
here is that at least some systems we interact with 
on or through the Internet are becoming a densely 
integrated exoself which can be considered a integral 
part of the persons that we are, or are becoming.
The idea of an exoself is a sort of deeply 
integrated computational system that acts as a 
proper part or component of the cognitive systems 
that makes us who we are as individual persons. 
The term exoself was originally coined by Greg 
Egan in his novel Permutation City2 “where it 
designates the sophisticated supervisory software 
that supports a digital mind online: it is able to 
provide information, monitor mental state(s), change 
it, and control its virtual environment as desired.” 
(Sandberg, Forthcoming). Sandberg suggests that 
our current generation of ICTs, the array of smart, 
mobile and wearable technology, and especially 
those that are connected to the Internet, may already 
be morphing into a sort of exoself. To be clear, if 
the exoself formulation is correct it is not just that 
ICTs are becoming deeply incorporated into our 
cognitive abilities, but rather, various such systems 
are becoming proper parts of us and especially, who 
we are as selves or persons.
For anyone familiar with recent debates on 
theoretical cognitive science the claim the Internet 
might count as an exoself is easily heard in terms 
of the hypothesis of the extended mind (Clark & 
Chalmers, 1998). According to this hypothesis, 
some of our interactions with artefacts or systems 
in our proximal environment can become so 
intimate, and our reliance upon them can become 
such a consistent and important characteristic of 
our cognitive life that it is reasonable to treat them 
as proper parts of us. Given the way many of us 
now rely upon the Internet, incorporating it into an 
ever-increasing range of our cognitive operations 
it is natural to wonder whether Internet resources 
and systems should now count as part of our minds. 
In regard to the exoselves claim specifically, the 
questions becomes under what circumstances, if any, 
should the Internet, or especially some of its parts 
or subsystems come to count as part of anyone’s 
extended self, or person?
The question I will focus on here is: what 
are the circumstances under which the Internet, or 
really systems of the Internet, could count as an 
exoself? I will interpret the claim in terms of the 
notion of persons, and especially, John Locke’s 
famous definition of a person in psychological terms 
as a “thinking intelligent being that has reflection 
and can consider itself, the same thinking thing 
in different times and places.” This allows us to 
reformulate the claim. Under what circumstances 
might sub-systems of the Internet contribute towards 
the psychological processes that make someone 
a person, or cognitive agent, that can recognize 
itself as the very same being over time? In order to 
get these questions off the ground, I will assume, 
that there is a non-identity between systems that 
contribute to my cognition, or my mind, and those 
that might be considered to contribute toward, or 
constitute me, or my identity as a person.3 So I 
assume that there are systems that can form part 
of our minds in the sense intended in Clark and 
Chalmers’ original paper, or more weakly make a 
cognitive contribution to our abilities, but should 
not be considered part of those systems that 
constitute us as persons. There are, on this view, 
systems that we can come to rely upon, which 
meet the conditions originally set out by Clark and 
Chalmers, that can come to play central roles in 
our cognitive lives, but for reasons we shall go on 
to examine, they are better regarded not as parts 
of ourselves, but ambient systems that make a less 
personal cognitive contribution. For the purposes 
of this discussion then I will interpret the claim 
about exoselves to mean something which is not 
part of my organisms that instantiate or make a 
major contribution to who I am as an individual 
human being, or my sense of who I am as such.
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There are several ways we might consider 
systems as exoselves, including those that are 
(1) mere online avatars with which we interact 
with online systems or virtual worlds; (2) ICT 
systems with which we interact with as part of 
everyday life and that could be considered to play 
a role in determining or constituting our nature as 
individual persons (or exoselves proper); or (3) 
a sort of ersatz or fake exoself I will here term 
a doppelganger; a concept upon which I shall 
elaborate in a moment4. In this paper I am much 
less interested in the first option which has been 
treated extensively elsewhere (Boellstorff, 2008; 
Schechtman, 2012). I will not directly treat how 
it is we are represented in online worlds or how 
this may change our sense of self.5
I am interested in how the Internet mediated 
assistants, interactive systems and personalized data 
shadows may not only structure our everyday lives 
but increasingly contribute to making us the persons 
we are. Assuming such systems exist, I am interested 
in how we should think of them. When, and under 
what circumstances are they better considered as 
real extensions of us as individuals, what I will 
here call exoselves –or exoselves proper– and when 
they are best considered as potentially detrimental 
impostures that I shall call doppelgangers?
Why use the term doppelgangers? Partly 
because the term is already somewhat in vogue, 
used to characterize tools such as Fitbits, that we 
may already use to regulate certain activities, but 
can take on a “rogue” character, eventually acting 
in ways that we feel oppress us, or in ways we feel 
curtail who we really take ourselves to be (Bode 
& Kristensen). The term as I use it comes from 
the literary tradition–perhaps best represented by 
Robert Louis Stephenson’s 1886 novel Strange 
Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde–of an evil twin 
or double that masquerades as a given person but 
acts with malicious intent against them and their 
interests6. If we accept the possibility that there 
are indeed Internet exoselves which extend us 
and partly constitute us, the possibility opens that 
there may also be related systems that, even though 
we rely upon them and use them as though they 
are a part of us, they may have a range of effects 
that could undermine or endanger our very nature 
as persons. Such ICT systems that appear to be 
exoselves but operate in ways that might subtly 
undermine our coherence as persons or agents, I 
shall term doppelgangers.
To examine these possibilities, in Section 2, I 
discuss three ways in which ICTs, more specifically 
Internet-based applications, may count as part of 
us as extended persons or agents. Each reflects a 
different possibility in the contemporary literature 
about the nature of self and personal identity, and 
different ways in which putative exoselves might 
contribute towards being proper parts of us and 
making us who we are. First, I look at systems that 
structure or partly realize our sense of ourselves 
through autobiographical memory and the sense 
of ongoing and connected consciousness that this 
establishes. I call them Self-Narrative Systems. 
Second, I discuss systems that constitute our skills 
or abilities, especially where the practice of those 
skills can be considered to define who we are 
through our skilful activities or capabilities. I call 
them Situated Capability Systems. Third, I look 
at systems that constitute our capacities for self-
regulation and agency. I call them Self-Regulative 
Systems. If we do have Internet-extended exoselves, 
so I will argue, it will likely be because one or 
more of these three types of systems are realized 
through the Internet.
Section 3 places the question of extended 
personhood into the context of the debate around 
when a given device should be counted as a genuine 
mind-extender which constitutes part of the cognitive 
system itself and when it is better to see a given 
artefact as merely potent scaffolding that forms 
part of the environment of cognition (e.g., Sterelny, 
2010). Heersmink and Sutton (2018) have recently 
recast this debate by advancing a multidimensional 
framework of factors that allow us to consider the 
depth of cognitive integration in any particular 
system. Through careful consideration of the 
accounts of extended persons in the previous section, 
I argue that even the sophisticated multidimensional 
approacch developed by Heersmink and Sutton 
cannot in itself provide a key to which systems 
should be considered as genuine person-extenders. 
This is because, of the three accounts of persons 
discussed in the previous section each require 
different integrative relationships to be in place 
for a given cognitive system to be extended. What 
is of issue here is not in any straightforward way 
the density of integration between an agent and an 
artefact –although this is important– but the nature 
of the cognitive function that integration supplies 
to the agent. A system that putatively extends 
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an agent with regard to its situated capability 
systems will likely be considered more or less 
densely integrated along a different set of factors 
that one which extends an agent along (e.g.) its 
self-regulative or narrative-self systems.
Section 4 discusses further circumstances in 
which a person (a mind or agent) can incorporate 
resources into itself in such a way that it remains 
a relatively integrated whole, and when such 
an integration is better understood as way of 
interrupting or destabilizing us as stable coherent 
persons. The crucial feature I argue is that they 
remain open to a degree of what I call agentive self-
regulation which is made possible especially where 
a given technology allows a degree of reflective 
transparency. It is our capacities to review, plan 
and submit our mental life to examination in the 
processes of self-scrutiny and self-determination 
which are vital here. Where ICT systems –especially 
through reflective opacity– make certain forms of 
self-scrutiny and self-reflection more difficult they 
undermine our abilities to operate autonomously. 
In these circumstances potential exoselves start to 
operate more like doppelgangers.
Finally, Section 5 examines some of 
the novel properties of a particular form of the 
Internet what I have previously called Cloud-Tech 
(Clowes, 2015b). I focus here on four properties 
of these Cloud-Tech resources which have 
implications for the question of exoselves namely, 
personalization, autonomy, social entanglement and 
reflective opacity. I concentrate on the problems 
of incorporating resources which are personalized 
to us –although not necessarily customized by 
us– through extensive data profiling. The other 
relevant properties are: social entanglement 
through which the cognitive properties of many 
social media systems are structured through the 
various links made through social media systems; 
autonomy, whereby many systems operate under the 
control of Ais; and reflective opacity in the sense 
that many Internet applications are organised by 
mechanisms over which have little vigilance and 
perhaps less cognitive control. Taken together, 
these four properties challenge the conditions 
under which agentive responsibility can be taken 
for these putatively mind-extending cognitive 
resources, and thus tend to produce systems which 
are better characterized as doppelgangers than as 
genuine exoselves.
SECTION 2: THREE WAYS OF 
THINKING THROUGH EXTENDED PERSONS
There is something subterranean about the 
way we have come to incorporate Internet resources 
into our cognitive lives without –in most cases– 
making a conscious decision to do so. We have 
become skilled and practiced users of a cognitively 
potent and increasingly mobile, ubiquitous technology 
which we incorporate into an ever-increasing range 
of our cognitive operations. Our reliance upon it 
can easily become so deep that it progressively it 
becomes invisible (Norman, 1999). It often takes a 
network outage, or a visit to some locale where we 
do not have wireless access, to reveal our cognitive 
reliance on the Internet.
Anders Sandberg tells the story of attending 
a conference in Beijing in 2006, when he became 
aware of his habit of constantly checking Wikipedia 
as he wrote a paper. It was precisely because the 
censorship regime present in China interrupted his 
normally habitual and unreflective use of Wikipedia 
that he became aware of his reliance upon it. Might 
we consider that the compromise to Sandberg’s 
ability to access a favoured tool goes beyond a 
personal inconvenience to –in this case transiently– 
compromising who he is as a person? If we take the 
notion of exoselves seriously, the suggestion is that 
we should. (Sandberg, Forthcoming).
When we do notice, the depth of our 
reliance on these new cognitive technologies can be 
startling. David Chalmers writing in 2007 argued 
that his iPhone has “already taken over central 
functions of my brain”: part of his memory, his 
desires, his mathematical abilities, and even his 
daydreaming now often depend on his use of his 
iPhone (Chalmers, 2007). Reflecting on similar 
themes, one recent paper asked whether the theft of 
a person’s smart phone might be better regarded as 
a crime against us as persons (assault) than against 
our property (simple theft) (Carter & Palermos, 
2016). If stealing my smart phone should count 
as a sort of personal assault rather than robbery it 
seems reasonable to assume it is a proper part of 
me. Highly personalized Internet-based apps and 
services may already be considered to be playing 
central roles in our structure as selves, persons or 
agents (Heersmink, 2016b).
There are in fact several rather different 
questions around self and persistence of self that 
bear on the question of whether ICTs might count 
as exoselves. First there are questions over what 
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makes us one and the same person over time. What 
are the reasons to say that I am the same person who 
worked for an Internet company in the East End 
of London twenty years ago, or in my teens hoped 
to be a Jazz fusion guitarist? These are questions 
of personal identity. Second there are questions of 
how I am constituted, out of what parts and how 
these parts and their interactions form or constitute 
me as a relatively unified or coherent person. Let 
us call these questions of self-constitution. Thirdly, 
there are questions of who I take myself to be, 
and how I –possibly quite fallibly– think about, 
understand, and identify myself. I will refer to these 
sorts of questions as questions about the sense of 
self. Perhaps ideally the answers to these questions 
would strongly interrelate: my self-constitution 
would guarantee my personal identity over time, 
and perhaps both would form the basis of my sense 
of self. I point out these distinctions here because 
there are several ways in which an exoself might be 
considered as a proper part of me, and various ways 
it might function in questions about who I am and 
who I take myself to be. I will not go much further 
into how these questions interrelate except to say 
that we could think of them as different aspects of 
personhood.
Yet, given this, it is important to note here 
that not all the systems composing the cognitive 
basis of human cognition need be considered as 
part of our self, our subjective sense of self, or 
constitutive of our personhood. At an organismic 
level we are beings whose cells are dying and being 
replaced at a rapid rate and yet we generally take 
ourselves and our fellows as beings who exhibit 
psychological continuity over time. Some systems 
of our brains and bodies –and as we shall see, 
possibly more extended systems– constitute us 
as enduring and more or less coherent beings to 
a greater extent than others7. But which cognitive 
systems are those that are the foundations of this 
continuity?
In what follows I build upon contemporary 
work from the recent literature that suggests 
different ways that artefactual systems might 
contribute either to our personal identity, or to 
self-constitution, or our sense of self. I identify 
broadly three types of extended system that might 
contribute to one or more of these aspects of 
personhood. I will not directly venture a conclusion 
over which system or set of systems should be 
given priority –if indeed any should. Rather, I 
will look at three different approaches to what 
it might mean for the Internet (or parts of it) to 
operate as an exoself. Although these approaches 
are not exclusive, and each build in rather different 
assumptions, I will first treat each as a separate 
thesis about the way in which the Internet or its 
parts could serve as an exoself.
First is the narrative approach to self. This 
approach holds roughly that much of our sense of 
self and especially our sense of continuity of self is 
determined by our ability to view our lives in terms 
of a personal narrative. The approach has its origins 
in John Locke’s idea that continuity of personhood 
depends upon, indeed is constituted by continuity 
or persistence of consciousness (Locke, 1979, 
p. 335). Neo-Lockeans have found it hard to make 
sense of what it would mean to have a continuation 
of consciousness and have tended to focus on the 
sorts of cognitive connectedness made possible by 
overlapping chains of psychological connectedness 
especially as made possible by memory (Parfit, 
1984; Schechtman, 2005).
Since memory is the central factor and 
especially the forms of episodic memory involved 
in the constitution of our narrative sense of self, 
several theorists have pointed out that the Internet 
can play a role in constituting our sense of self 
and indeed personal identity (Clowes, 2012, 2013; 
Heersmink, 2016b, 2018). As more of us store digital 
photos and other mementos online, Internet based 
ICTS become ever-more significant in how we 
remember past events. It is natural to wonder whether 
some Internet systems are extending our sense of 
self. Narrative approaches have been especially 
championed and developed by Richard Heersmink 
in the context of Internet related memory systems 
(Heersmink, 2015b, 2018). Heersmink argues that 
Internet-based systems can implement the four 
properties of self-narratives: 1: self-narratives are 
dynamically arranged (rather than fixed) systems of 
past events; 2: events are chosen selectively rather 
than presented as an exhaustive presentation of 
past events; 3: a subjective interpretation of events 
(often from a first-person point of view); 4: events 
are depicted in the narrative in a causally related 
way (Heersmink, 2018)8.
Heersmink argues for an extended 
interpretation of this narrative account that “personal 
identity can neither be reduced to psychological 
structures instantiated by the brain nor by biological 
structures instantiated by the organism, but should be 
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seen as an environmentally-distributed and relational 
construct.” (Heersmink, 2016b, p. 1). He develops this 
approach starting with socially distributed memory 
systems and then extends the analysis to more 
technical systems including lifelogging systems9. 
Insofar as a large part of the world population now 
uses devices like smart-phones to take pictures 
(select parts of their personal narratives), view, 
shows and distribute these pictures (thus reviewing 
and organising their personal narrative), there is a 
strong initial argument that the Internet systems 
play an important role in both our sense of self and 
sense of continuity of self over time.
A second approach I call the situated-
embodied capability approach to self, or just 
the situated capability approach. This approach 
emphasizes how what we are as persons, and our 
cognitive character, is not just given in our explicit 
sense of self or self-reflective processes, but also 
through our skills (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980), 
situated affective states (Colombetti & Krueger, 
2015), habits (Butler & Gallagher, 2018) and the 
host of background cognitive capabilities that 
constitute embodied subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962)10. Here I want to emphasize how many of 
these capabilities are evoked for human beings in the 
interactive domain of artefacts and artefact-centred 
human practice (Hutchins, 1995; Turkle, 2007). 
Such situated capabilities are not simple productions 
of our brains, or even brains and bodies, but are 
called-forth and enacted through our interactions 
with and dependence upon the world of artefacts 
(Malafouris, 2015).
One illustration of this idea in relation to 
ICTS would be an architect whose abilities to carry 
out her work have come to depend upon her skills 
as a CAD/CAM operator. On losing access to some 
software upon which many of her skills depend, she 
might feel that central capacities to think, imagine 
and be herself have similarly been compromised11. 
One could argue that such implies a compromise to 
our architect’s sense of self in ways that are more 
profound that the loss of access to digitally encoded 
memories upon which her narrative sense of self 
might depend. On the situated capability approach, 
it is not our conscious sense of what or who we 
are that matters here, but our pre-reflective sense 
of ourselves as given in our skills and practices. A 
guiding thought here is that systems can become 
deeply embedded in our implicit and pre-conscious 
mechanisms of cognition and action that they come 
to be relied upon in just the way that brain and 
body rely upon its own biological parts12. This 
approach concurs with Anders Sandberg’s claim 
that Wikipedia should count as part of his exoself. 
Sandberg is a researcher and writer and insofar as 
he is constantly drawing upon Google to look up 
references, structure his skilful practices of writing 
and editing papers, it makes sense to think of these 
resources as an important part of what makes 
Sandberg who he is. This approach accords with 
the more general case of the extended mind, which, 
as Clark has it, it also naturally shades into the idea 
of an extended self (Clark, 2006).
Clark’s Natural Born Cyborgs develops a 
scenario to illustrate this artefactual dependence 
of self on personalized ICTs. Clark imagines a 
near-future Internet user who has been interacting 
with an sophisticated Internet based system –the 
MamboBot– since childhood. This Bot has been 
contributing to its user’s “taste for the weird and 
exotic for three and a half decades” (Clark, 2003, 
p. 129) coming online when he was five. In Clark’s 
scenario, the system user only started to notice 
his Bot has been disabled after several months in 
which time he had been feeling “unusually flat and 
uninspired for a while” (ibid.). This scenario nicely 
captures how Internet systems might contribute 
to the identity and sense of self of an agent even 
while operating in the background of consciousness. 
The situated capability approach holds that it is 
our largely unconscious or pre-reflective reliance 
on tools and our worldly embedding that implies 
that some external systems should count as partly 
constituting us as persons13.
As this capability approach hinges, not upon 
any explicit sense of self, but upon how our sense 
of ourselves arises in the background, through 
what we can do, it has a somewhat Heideggerian 
flavour–I originally termed it the cognitive hinterland 
approach to self. On this view, self is not some inner 
essence, or even dimensions of consciousness, but 
disclosed through various forms of worldly interaction 
(Escudero, 2014; Heidegger, 1927). Such worldly 
interactions need to be understood in terms of our 
situatedness in social (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2008) 
and artefactual world (Olsen, 2010). Another way 
of coming at this is to note that much of what we 
are may never make it into conscious reflection. If 
what I am as a person is only constituted by that 
upon which I can consciously reflect upon, then 
personhood would have to leave out the immense 
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cognitive background upon which those conscious 
processes of reflection, selection and refinement 
must draw upon. We would be left with a sort of 
iceberg tip account of personhood. Although not 
equivalent, this view connects with a wider set of 
phenomenological intuitions which emphasize that 
it is the background of consciousness, or in what is 
sometimes called our pre-reflective sense of self14. 
Insofar as artefacts play an uneliminable role in 
our situated capabilities they can be considered as 
potential part-constituters of us as persons.
Thirdly, there is what I shall call the 
Regulative Agency approach, according to which, 
exoselves extend the mind’s ability to reflect upon 
and review its own mental states and thus regulate 
itself. This third approach concentrates on how what 
persons are depends upon the distinctive structure 
of human agency and that has also been called the 
structure of a person’s will. Its intellectual backdrop 
is an influential treatment by Harry Frankfurt which 
made the link between personhood and the ability 
to take control of one’s own will (Frankfurt, 1971). 
Central to this structure is the capacity to evaluate 
and take pro and con attitudes towards one’s own 
desires that we might call metacognitive. On this 
view it is claimed that we human beings–and any 
other creature we might designate as persons–do not 
just have beliefs and desires but have the capacity 
to take attitudes about those beliefs and desires. On 
this analysis, persons have a distinctive structure to 
their will which involves the capacity for reflection 
upon one’s projects and goals that we might call 
metacognition. This capacity is considered central 
to human temporally extended agency –sometimes 
called strong agency15– which is defined in terms 
of our capacity for reflection, self-evaluation, 
self-regulation and organisation of ourselves with 
respect to live projects over time (Bratman, 2000). 
On the regulative agency approach to persons it is 
our abilities to reflect on our mental states, take 
attitudes towards them, and–at least potentially–
regulate ourselves with respect to those attitudes 
which is central to our status as persons (Clowes, 
2020; Frankfurt, 1971).
Let us note here that ICTs and Internet based 
software are already being extensively used as a 
form of self-regulation tool, from the regulation 
of emotional states with iPods (Bull, 2008), to the 
regulation of ourselves through a host of planning 
and self-regulation ICTs (Clowes, 2019; Duus, 
Cooray, & Page, 2018). I have developed analyses of 
examples using tools such as Fitbit for self-regulation 
and although Internet systems are often associated 
with the dissipation of agency (Carr, 2010) there is 
evidence that they can be used in ways that facilitate 
more positive form of self-regulation (Duus et al., 
2018). Sandberg hints at something like this in 
his article when he writes that: ‘exoself devices 
act as cybernetic regulators monitoring action and 
promoting “virtue”, (Sandberg, Forthcoming)16. 
There are questions with respect to what Michael 
Bratman (2000) call temporally extended agency 
over whether such tools are set up to allow the 
forms of reflection taken to be crucial to the proper 
sort of self-regulation (I return to these questions 
below in Section 4).
We can ask here whether Sandberg’s sense 
of the feeling detached from his exoself meets 
up with any of these factors in our account of the 
three sources of personhood. It is not obvious 
that the attenuation of his link to Wikipedia either 
greatly effects his narrative sense of self. Most of 
us are unlikely to be so reliant on the Internet for 
the immediate organisation of autobiographical 
memories (at least synchronically). It is thus 
unlikely Sandberg really felt that is sense of himself 
as distinct person with his own life narrative was 
seriously compromised by temporary lack of 
access to the Internet17. Neither do his abilities 
of self-reflection nor self-governance directly 
affected by the censorship regime18. It is more 
natural to associate Sandberg’s concerns along 
with our second factor: situated capabilities. 
Given Sandberg’s sense of self and even person 
identity is likely richly bound up with his status and 
profession as scholar and academic, and moreover 
those capacities depend on what the cognitive 
ecology made possible by the Internet, it is likely 
his sense of himself is somewhat compromised by 
interference with his access to the Internet.
Given this initial analysis I will now venture 
two observations. First, just because some of 
our cognitive systems depend upon or are even 
constituted by the Internet does not mean that loss 
or compromise to those systems will necessarily 
compromise our sense of self, or, who we are as 
persons. Second, whether such a compromise 
really has these implications will depend upon 
both what approach (or combination of approaches) 
we take to the extended self. On a narrative 
approach it will be systems which influence or 
constitute autobiographical memory which will 
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be of importance. On a capability approach it 
will be those systems that compose the array of 
ambient technologies on which particular skills or 
capabilities depend that will be central to our sense 
of self. On a regulative agency approach it will be 
those systems which influence our ability to plan, 
reflect upon our decisions and organise ourselves. 
This of course complicates our picture of what 
extended systems might count as exoselves. This 
will require further analysis, but at this juncture we 
might say that –in the absence of further accounts 
of how extended systems might come to count as 
proper parts of us as persons– we will assume it 
is only systems that we interact with in one of 
the three ways described above that are likely be 
constituents of who we are19.
SECTION 3:  THE PERSONAL 
INCORPORATION OF TOOLS
In a celebrated thought experiment from 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) paper, we are asked 
to imagine Otto, who suffers from Alzheimer’s 
disease but has come to rely on his trusty notebook 
to organize his life and store the plans and memories 
which now tax his biological brain. Because of the 
functional similarities with how Otto stores and 
organizes the believes and desires in his notebook, 
we are to consider that not just Otto’s cognition, but 
his mind is extended into, that is, partly realized 
by his notebook. The Extended Mind tradition 
gives us a set of criteria, that attempt to settle 
the boundaries of the mind in a way that doesn’t 
make an arbitrary array of resources parts of our 
minds. The conditions are, first, Availability: “ 
the notebook is a constant in Otto’s life - in cases 
where the information in the notebook would be 
relevant, he will rarely take action without consulting 
it.” Second, Accessibility: “the information in the 
notebook is directly available without difficulty.” 
Third, Trust: “upon retrieving information from 
the notebook he automatically endorses it.”20. The 
conditions have become known as “trust-and-glue”.
In one of the first treatments of the question 
in relation to Internet resources, Paul Smart (2012) 
argued that web-resources circa 2012 were not 
well poised for incorporation of cognitive lives 
of users. However, as a main mode of accessing 
the web has since become the smartphone, these 
concerns have arguably lost much of their force 
(Clowes, 2015b). A cursory examination of 
today’s highly mobile Internet gadgetry seems 
to indicate many smart-phone users employ their 
technology in ways that seem to meet the trust-
and-glue conditions. Gadgetry like smart-phones 
form a constant accompaniment to many user’s 
lives, and it seems that an ever-widening set of 
our cognitive operations involve some usage of 
these technologies. Our increasingly intimate 
and intense usage of mobile digital technologies 
such as smart-phones, iPads and Fitbits suggest 
that certain contemporary digital technologies 
easily meet the original conditions (Chalmers, 
2007; Clowes, 2012). But perhaps too easily! In 
the context of the ubiquitous Internet, data centric 
applications and personalized gadgetry, the original 
conditions seem to lead to the notorious problem of 
cognitive bloat; to the point that threaten a reductio 
ad absurdum of the original claims.
According to an alternative theoretical 
approach, the scaffolding approach (Sterelny, 2010) 
artefacts are not, for the most part, best seen as 
part of any individual’s mind but part of a common 
store of technology, skill supporting artefacts and 
representational systems that can be leveraged 
by individual agents and groups of agents. On 
this scaffolding approach, although many of our 
cognitive abilities depend on the presence of the 
right environmental resources21, this does not mean 
that such artefacts are parts of individual human 
minds. Sterelny argues that a central reason we 
might prefer the scaffolding approach is that the 
original trust and glue conditions are significantly 
too liberal. They might include all sorts of things 
as supposed proper parts of our minds that might 
be better treated as cognitively potent systems 
which are nevertheless not parts of us. Consider 
the London Tube Map.
A forgetful commuter might use the tube-
map in ways that imply all four of the trust and 
glue conditions, and yet for all of that, we might 
be disinclined to grant that the tube-map should 
count as part of her mind. Why? Because the 
map is a public ready-made resource used in the 
same or very similar sorts of ways by millions of 
travellers each year even though they-themselves 
make no active contribution to it. It might make 
more sense to think of such resources as a sort 
of cognitive commons (Dror & Harnad, 2008). 
Such resources can contribute to the cognitive 
capacities of many individual agents without, 
needing to count as a proper part of anyone’s 
mind. (Of course, many such resources might, at 
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the level of property relations, be considered as 
owned by individuals, states or corporations, but 
this is a separate conceptual issue).
For Sterelny, an artefact can count as a part 
of an agent’s mind only if that agent has customised 
the artefact to its own mind –what Sterelny calls 
individualization– and crucially, then come to rely 
on those very customisations in its cognitive routines 
–what he calls entrenchment. He urges that the 
vast majority of artefacts that make a contribution 
to our cognitive prowess are best considered as 
merely scaffolds. It is only the highly trusted, and 
crucially for him, the individualised and entrenched 
resources that we should potentially consider as 
parts of our minds and these are very few of the 
total space of cognitive scaffolds. Importantly, this 
view does not exclude artefacts and systems as 
meeting those conditions and it becomes a matter 
of investigation of artefact to agent relations in 
determining which might be candidates22.
Yet, at least some Internet resources seem to 
readily meet Sterelny’s extra conditions23. Today 
many Internet resources have become a series of 
database produced systems where information is 
dynamically customised to meet the preferences 
and profiles of individual users. Social media 
systems like facebook require a personalized 
profile (or avatar?) through which we interact with 
others. Indeed, the sorts of systems once called 
Web 2.0 are more or less defined by a degree of 
personalisation. Individualisation of a sort appears 
to be the norm.
An alternative approach proposes that we 
consider a multidimensional space of factors in 
order to assess such complex matter of integration 
between an agent and a resource. Richard 
Heersmink and John Sutton (Heersmink, 2015a; 
Heersmink & Sutton, 2018) suggest a series of 
factors drawn both from the literature I have 
already described and some wider discussion of 
second wave approaches to the extended mind 
(Menary, 2010; Sutton, 2010). These incorporate 
familiar categories such as trust, accessibility and 
availability –under the refined terminology of 
reliability and durability– individualization and 
what the call transformation (related to Sterelny’s 
entrenchment). In addition, they suggest two types 
of transparency –informational and procedural24– 
which are designed to capture different ways 
in which an artefact and its interface can be 
transparent-in-use. A final category information 
flow is designed to capture how the dynamics of 
interaction between an agent and the resource can 
be one-way, two-way or reciprocal. Heersmink and 
Sutton argue that there is no set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions for counting something as 
part of our minds or not, rather we should consider 
systems as more or less tightly integrated or more 
or less densely incorporated25.
Our focus here is on not just whether tool 
might extend our minds but extend us as selves or 
persons. In this regard Sterelny’s entrenchment and 
individualisation or even Heersmink and Sutton 
extended dimensional approach may only be quite 
indirect guides to what might play a constitutive 
role in us as persons. This depends much more 
upon what we use these tools for. Do they play 
important roles in one of the cognitive systems I 
identified in the previous section? Do they play a 
role in our narrative construction of self, or the basis 
of skilled action or over our abilities self-reflection 
and determination? Even a highly entrenched and 
customized tool that is transparent-in-use, involves 
reciprocal information flows, and otherwise meets 
the trust and glue conditions might not play a role 
in our sense of self if it doesn’t play a role in one 
of the three areas I have previously identified, 
i.e., in terms of narrative, situated capabilities or 
agentive self-regulation. Now let us consider how 
Internet apps might function in the capability role.
Let us consider Talia, a Tour Guide and 
driver of a three-wheeled Taxi-cycle in her native 
city of Lisbon. She relies upon Google Maps to 
maintain a list of customized favourites that help 
her provide customized tours of the busy roads 
and changeable traffic conditions in complex 
city in which she lives and works. Thanks to her 
personalized customisations of city-maps, she is 
able to find her way to destinations of interest to 
her clients, finding the quickest, most convenient 
and scenic route based upon what the current 
traffic conditions are. Her personal driving habits 
regularly make use of this system, and specifically 
the way she has customized it to her needs and 
patterns of use. She has moreover fully entrenched 
those patterns into her working life, and she has 
significantly customized and personalized –or 
transformed, to use the terms favoured by Heersmink 
and Sutton– the apps she needs to do her job. 
The Transparency-in-use (in both the procedural 
and informational senses) of Talia’s map system 
depends both upon the familiarity of the systems 
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interface and Talia’s hard-won skills build over 
a long-term and ongoing reliance on the system 
(durability). Importantly for our first concept of 
personhood–the situated-embodied capability 
approach, Talia’s core sense of self becomes 
invested in the capabilities she possesses in part 
through her cognitive incorporation of the app.
Talia is also a heavy user of various social 
media services in both her professional and personal 
life. She often takes a dozen or more photos a day 
uploading them to one of several social media 
systems as part of busy social life which she tags 
and circulates to friends. She frequently muses upon 
these photos and her various posts throughout the 
day, noting the comments they elicit from friends 
and acquaintances in her social circle. Her memory 
of many events is in several ways dependent 
upon this social media. In recent times some of 
social media systems seem to be getting more 
sophisticated. The Android operating system on 
her mobile phone for instances integrates closely 
with the photo app she uses. It frequently suggests 
that Talia “remember the day” which prompts her 
review series of photos and occasions that she has 
taken sometimes several years ago. She has noticed 
how viewing these “spontaneously” suggested 
photos sometimes shapes her ruminations about 
her life for the rest of day, and Talia wonders how 
much her memory is being shaped by the usage of 
these sorts of apps. She also spends time carefully 
curating the images that she keeps in the cloud and 
shows to others. The reciprocal two-way flow of 
information ensures her deep engagement with her 
online systems and –through them– with her circle 
of friends and extended circle of acquaintances. 
Talia’s sense of herself and her personal narrative is 
deeply involved with, structured and consolidated 
by her daily interaction with her social media feeds. 
Her ongoing narrative sense of self is deeply bound 
up with her use of this technology.
Finally, Talia is a careful and committed 
user of self-tracking devices and software which 
she uses extensively to measure, reflect upon 
and organise her life. In addition to tracking her 
life with photos she uses a variety of software 
systems including calendaring systems, task 
systems, tracking systems and hardware such as 
her trusty Fitbit –a wearable activity tracker– to 
track, examine and regulate many of her activities. 
Such systems can provide extensive capabilities 
for users to monitor a vast variety of data about 
themselves and their ongoing activities. In this case 
the customisations and entrenchments are clear. 
Talia is a conscientious user of her Fitbit. Using the 
accompanying software, she shares information with 
friends from her wide social network with whom 
she competes to perform the required number of 
steps per day, enlisting their support and feedback 
to motivate her fitness regime. Talia relies on her 
collection of devices and software systems to 
regulate herself. Talia is an enthusiastic life-logger 
and many of the apps on her mobile phone provide 
durable, transparent and highly pervasive systems 
for self-regulation (Lupton, 2016; Swan, 2013). On 
the regulative agency approach it is Talia’s ability 
to individualize the technologies that is of crucial 
importance alongside her trust in the reliability of 
the technologies built through long reliance on 
their affordances. Although transparency-in-use 
(both procedural and informational) is important 
here of greater importance is what I shall call 
reflective transparency. This is the ability to 
control and reflectively focus upon how whether 
she is meeting her goals and how well her various 
devices support her aims. (I will explain this idea 
in more detail in the next section).
It is important to note here that different 
factors of the interaction become salient depending 
upon which of the sources of personhood we are 
interested, i.e., narrative, situated skills or regulative 
agency. There are not obviously any one or two 
factors that would allow us to characterise the deep 
involvement of technologies in Talia’s sense of self 
or personhood. What is important is, as Heersmink 
and Sutton (2018) suggest, is a range of factors, 
including –in some cases– what I have called 
reflective transparency. Yet, simply summing factors 
to attempt to characterise interactions as more or 
less dense will not in itself help us determine when 
a device or system is operating as an exoself. What 
matters is the character of the interaction and the 
aspect of personhood in which we are interested. 
Systems involved in self-narrative have a different 
cognitive profile from systems involved in self-
regulation which have a different profile again from 
situated skills. The multidimensional approach may 
offer the theorist a heuristic and a variety of ways of 
analysing agent / artefact interactions, but it cannot 
tell us in advance of an analysis which factors will 
be of prime importance. This will depend on which 
cognitive capacities we are investigating.
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Thanks to our prior analysis of personhood, 
however we are in the position to say that Talia, is 
in large part the person she is through the use and 
reliance upon a heterogeneous set of Internet based 
apps. The life she leads and the person she is, is 
enabled and made possible through her ongoing 
use and dependence upon these highly entrenched 
and individualised technologies. Deprived of these 
technologies she would not be the same person.
S E C T I O N  4 :  R E F L E C T I V E 
TRANSPARENCY AND THE LIMITS 
OF AGENTIVE SELF-REGULATION
I now want to consider an alternative 
scenario where even apparently deeply integrated 
technological systems do not appear to operate as 
extensions of an individual’s person; but rather, or 
in virtue of the particular form of the integration, 
endanger or undermine the grounds that the 
“extended agent” is a person at all. Consider Cloud-
Otto –a contemporary version of Otto from Clark 
and Chalmers’s original thought experiment– who 
carries his smart-phone wherever he goes. His 
smart-phone is connected to his own favourite social 
media / data repository, and he uses the device to 
access, track and revise his set of extended beliefs 
and desires in much the same way as the original 
Otto did with his paper and pen.
Amongst the many apps he relies upon is 
one called the WeGo-Everyday-Destination app 
which helps Cloud-Otto both track and manage his 
everyday travels around his home city of New York. 
Cloud-Otto has customised access to his copy of 
the WeGo app by creating his own top ten list of 
places he likes to visit. The app automatically records 
the last time he visited each of those destinations 
and his own star ratings based upon how much he 
enjoyed his visit. WeGo also links to Otto’s map 
application and calendar and includes a set of 
automatic notifications telling him where he should 
be going each day, along with audio instructions 
about how to get to his chosen destination. The WeGo 
system maintains this list for him sending him an 
email notification each day about his destination 
and sees him safely there.
Thanks to WeGo he visits all 10 favourite 
locations in New York in ordered succession. If he 
visits MOMA today it will fall to the bottom of the 
list and he will then not visit it for nine days (not 
including Sunday when he always goes to church 
with thanks to helpful WeGo reminders). In this way, 
Cloud-Otto can be sure to visit his own ten favourite 
hangouts in succession and lets WeGo remember 
for him the next time he should go.
Now let’s imagine that unbeknownst to 
Cloud-Otto, WeGo has just “upgraded” its services. 
It sends him an email about the new terms-of-
service, but he was having a busy afternoon at 
the Empire State Building and failed to read 
the message in detail. WeGo has added a social 
media aspect to his favourites list and given him a 
“free” subscription to the new WeGo basic. What 
this means is that –unless he opts out or pays the 
subscription– Cloud-Otto’s favourites are now just 
the top-ten favourite locations of visitors to New 
York. WeGo basic provides Cloud-Otto’s daily 
destination by selecting whichever tourist attraction 
got the highest star rating from visitors in the last 
week. This has so far always been the Empire State 
Building. Otto is now, unbeknownst to himself no 
longer visiting not his pre-selected list of favourite 
locales, but rather is being unwittingly driven 
by the commercial policies and the inscrutable 
collective mind to visit the same destination over 
and over again.
Cloud-Otto has fully entrenched WeGo into 
his own everyday habits and activities and he uses 
it without reflection as transparent equipment. The 
system meets both the trust and glue conditions and 
even Sterelny’s (2010) more strenuous requirements 
of individualisation and entrenchment. If we were 
to measure Cloud-Otto’s interactions with WeGo on 
Heersmink and Sutton’s (2018) multidimensional 
scale we would likely conclude that the interaction 
was dense and therefore the app likely of constitutive 
relevance to his mind. Cloud-Otto trusts the WeGo 
resources, he has highly practiced and skilled 
usage of them –at least by his own lights– and he 
has customised and entrenched the app to his own 
activities. His usage moreover appears to be both 
informationally and procedurally transparent, and, 
thanks to fact that WeGo tracks and records Otto’s 
visits the informational flow can be considered 
reciprocal26. Cloud-Otto’s WeGo system could 
moreover be seen as operating as an exoself. We 
can easily imagine that Otto’s sense of himself and 
his skilled abilities to find his way through his city 
depend on his ongoing interaction with his good 
devices.
And yet, there is something very odd about 
counting WeGo as properly belonging to or being a 
proper part of Otto when he has no apparent ability 
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to control them or even notice that they are operating 
outside his intended purposes. The reason I claim 
is that Cloud-Otto is no longer able to operate as 
a self-governing agent. This is in large part to do 
with the lack of reflective transparency of the WeGo 
system. I shall now explain this idea.
I use the term reflective opacity to specifically 
refer to that property of ICTs whereby their 
mechanisms of functioning and processing operations 
are either partly or entirely hidden from the user’s 
view. Reflective transparency by contrast refers to the 
extent to which a given ICT system reveals, or allows 
the user to make visible, some of the informational 
mechanisms – such as some idea of the underlying 
algorithms– through which a given interface is 
produced. The way in which such reflectively 
transparency can be manifested will however 
typically be by the making available to the user a 
capacity to customize and selectively control what 
information will be available to them in situations 
of their choice. In this way reflective transparency 
will often be strongly related to the degree and 
ease of customizability and personalization of a 
given interface.
I have previously sometimes referred to 
this quality of reflective transparency as cognitive 
penetrability (Clowes, 2013, p. 116; 2015b), in an 
attempt to capture the idea that in some uses of 
(especially) information technology we can “see 
through or into” the interface in a way that lets 
us understand something of the algorithms that 
determine its functioning. However, because this 
term is used in a somewhat different way in other 
areas of the philosophical literature (e.g., Siegel, 
2012). I prefer now to refer to reflective transparency 
to hopefully capture the idea that a device is 
somewhat open to our cognitive scrutiny and affords 
a degree of reflection and ideally control. Reflective 
transparency can often run counter to transparency-
in-use (especially procedural transparency) in the 
sense that a device–like Heidegger’s hammer which 
his workman acts through in order to perform some 
hammering–becomes, at least for the duration of the 
skilled action, reflectively opaque. It is important to 
note however that there is some flexibility here. The 
very same tool might be at time more procedurally 
transparent and at others more reflectively transparent. 
This will depend on a series of factors including 
our orientation and skill toward the tool, how it is 
built and designed and also what we are trying to 
do with it at any given time.
The property of reflectively transparency 
–which appears not to be treated in, but 
significantly complicates, the Heersmink and 
Sutton multidimensional taxonomy– is of great 
importance here because, it is in cases where such 
reflective transparency is low or absent that practicing 
regulative agency becomes impeded. There will 
always be degrees of such reflective transparency; 
arguably informational interfaces cannot be wholly 
transparent with respect to their mechanisms27. But 
where reflective transparency is nearly or wholly 
absent, it becomes hard or impossible for a cognitive 
agent to maintain the appropriate levels of cognitive 
vigilance to its putative mental states.
Thus, to return to Cloud-Otto, it is because 
of the functional changes in WeGo app, and 
especially the highly impeded relationship of 
reflective transparency between him and his 
equipment, that it is hard to see the system as 
operating either in his interests or out of his own 
will. It is harder still to see these systems as a part 
of him that constitute him as a person. I suppose it 
is still possible to claim that the system is part of 
Otto’s mind. However, this comes at the prices of 
making it difficult to see Cloud Otto as a coherent 
cognitive agent at all28. The resources of WeGo 
may be tightly integrated into Cloud-Otto but 
they have undermined his status as an agent in 
the process. At this point, the WeGo system, even 
though its design may not have been maliciously 
intended, is best regarded not as an exoself but a 
form of doppelganger.
Please note how this links to the Regulative 
Agency account of personhood I introduced in 
Section 2 of this paper. Human-like minds–
the minds of persons–have the capacity to 
metacognitively take attitudes about at least 
some of their beliefs and desires (Frankfurt, 
1971). Moreover, they have the ability to regulate 
themselves through processes of planning, 
self-reflection and future-orientation (Bratman, 
2000), a process that similarly relies forms of 
metacognition. On these related accounts, it is 
through inspecting our thoughts and taking stances 
upon them that we can regulate ourselves. Being 
able to enact this sort of self-regulative agency 
is, or so I claim, a central part of what it means 
to be a person (Clowes, 2020). Minds that do not 
have these abilities because, e.g. some of their 
parts are obscured in such a way to interrupt such 
planning and reflective capabilities may, beyond 
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some slightly indeterminate point, cease to count 
as strong agents and in some senses as persons.
The structure of human agency appears to 
require that we can make at least some aspects of 
our mental life open for scrutiny such that they can 
be, reflected upon, identified with (or rejected), 
regulated and in principal controlled (Frankfurt, 
1987). It is possible that many of these capacities 
(of strong agency) originate not in a pure internal 
realm but through the use of tools and our habits 
of interaction with them (Dennett, 1996; Luria & 
Vygotsky, 1992; Malafouris, 2008). In previous work 
on agency I have emphasized how it is our abilities 
to externalise and (in one sense) objectify aspects 
of inner life that make possible agentive reflection, 
and taking pro and contra attitudes with respect to 
our self-organisation (Clowes, 2019). Tying knots 
in string, making marks on paper and now–in 
the time of ICT technology–interacting with an 
increasing set of “smart” devices, human beings use 
artefacts to examine, organise and restructure their 
activities and themselves. The way we appropriate 
and use artefacts from our material environment 
to produce cognitive episodes constitutes much 
of our mental life (Malafouris, 2013). These 
capabilities may then later be internalized in a 
way that the external material culture is no longer 
needed (Vygotsky, 1986), although very often 
we will continue to rely on props and artefacts to 
structure our thoughts and activities. Indeed, the 
use of ICTs to embody these sorts of self-control 
functions already seems to be very widespread 
(Duus et al., 2018). Indeed, it is likely that the 
agentive character of human mental life and its 
relationship to how we are constituted as persons 
is reliant upon our use of tools and artefacts. Any 
situated-embodied approach that takes human 
agency seriously needs to come to terms with the 
ways in which that agency is bound up with our 
creation and use of our tools and devices.
The corollary of this is that any artefact or 
system that tends to undermine these capacities to 
self-monitor, self-regulate and correct our plans 
and habits as needed will tend to undermine our 
strong-agentive capacities. The danger is that 
putative Internet exoselves can be designed or, 
just tend to operate, in ways that can contribute to 
undermining our complex self-monitoring, reflection 
and ultimately self-organisation. And here it is 
clear that at least some ICTs may systematically 
mask the workings of their algorithms, making the 
modes of operations of many ICT systems hidden. 
Such cognitively or reflectively opaque systems 
can undermine the basis of strong human agency.
However, in apparent contradiction to this 
point, recent discussion around the possibility 
of artefacts counting as part of one’s extended 
mind have precisely turned on the question of 
whether agentive scrutiny is required in order for a 
resource to count as part of an agent (Clark, 2015; 
Palermos, 2014). The problem is that our own 
biological resources they precisely seem to work 
as transparent equipment that we are not able to 
inspect or validate29. Shouldn’t we, for reasons of 
parity expect extended systems to have the same 
sort of epistemic role? And yet as we have seen, 
where I am unable to practice the appropriate 
cognitive vigilance –apparently requiring reflective 
transparency– those opaque systems appear to be 
operating independently of me.30
Orestis Palermos offers an analysis of the 
tight integration of certain types of vigilance that 
appear to be necessary for an agent to be said 
to have knowledge. He writes “This sense of 
epistemically adequate-yet unreflective-cognitive 
responsibility can only be achieved by agents like 
us, whose intellectual capacities are appropriately 
interconnected such that cases where there is 
something wrong with the way we form our beliefs 
or with the beliefs themselves, we will be able to 
notice this and respond appropriately.” p. 1934. 
(Palermos, 2014). While I think Palermos is on 
the right track, it is not only the belief formation 
process which is undermined by unreflective 
cognitive incorporation. Rather, it is the coherence 
and integrity of the cognitive agent itself which is 
endangered when that agent is unable to regulate 
itself with its own plans and intentions. It is this 
ability to exercise regulative agency, or so I claim, 
which makes it possible for us to take possession of 
exoselves. When this sort of regulation is impossible 
or seriously undermined and the agent is unable to 
regulate its putative exo-parts then the creation of 
doppelganger systems become a real possibility.
I have elsewhere argued that Epistemic 
Feelings can play an important role in helping 
us integrate even highly opaque systems if we 
are able to adjust to their operation over time 
(Clowes, 2017). For, although we may lack a 
conscious model of how a system operates, we 
may nevertheless develop an intuitive sense of 
how even quite opaque algorithmic systems may 
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operate if we are vigilant toward how it tends to 
prompt our actions. This will be a matter of degree. 
Insofar as the set of capacities that underlie strong 
agency –regulating ongoing activities, making and 
keeping resolutions, or simply introspecting on the 
available motivations for our actions– rely upon 
systems over which I have weak vigilance these 
systems will tend to undermine my capacities to 
exhibit strong agency. This is where there may be 
some historical discontinuity. External systems 
which make our ability to notice changes opaque 
are arguably the opposite to the norm, at least 
where self-regulation is concerned. Unfortunately, 
many ICT systems that operate as exoselves may 
tend to undermine this sort of tool-mediated self-
vigilance. It is when such systems make possible 
agentive self-regulation that they may be considered 
candidates for being exoselves. Insofar as they 
undermine activities of self-scrutiny, the way is 
open for doppelgangers.
Many systems involved in human self-
regulation are indeed extended systems. They 
are neither natural in a sense that makes them 
independent of material culture, not inner in the 
sense of being purely private and introspective, 
but they exist thanks to social or artefactual 
means that are often partly external and open to 
scrutiny. We know if we have previously violated 
a maxim in part because we remember telling a 
friend about it (and they might remind us!). We 
remember to take out the rubbish because we leave 
the bag by the door. We know we have failed to 
take the required number of steps today because 
we previously set the reminder in our Fitbit app 
and it alerts us. I suggest there is a continuity at 
work here but in general agentive self-regulation 
is typically an extended, culturally developed and 
artefactually enabled practice (Clowes, 2019)31. 
Self-regulative processes are typically not purely 
inner in any Cartesian sense. Rather our capacities 
for agentive self-regulation depend upon us being 
able to reflect on the reasons for at least some of 
our behaviours, something we might call reflective 
transparency. Very often such reflection depends 
upon our artefactual culture. It is, in terms Lambros 
Malafouris has developed, materially engaged.
In some –perhaps most– situations 
transparency-in-use is a central aspect of artefact 
agent couplings if they are to count as potential 
mind-extenders. This partly follows the parity 
principle intuition that, e.g., a memory-trace 
retrieved from an artefact should be cognitively 
entertained in a way which involves automatic 
endorsement in a way that is equivalent to biological 
cognitive systems; memory retrieval on this view 
should not involve agent questioning its own 
memory system. (However, whether memory 
retrieval is always such an unquestioning process 
is controversial.32) It also partly follows from an 
intuition about transparency-in-use that goes back 
to Heidegger. On his account of hammer use the 
hammer becomes phenomenologically lost to the 
craftsman while involving in some hammering. 
The craftsman’s attention is on the target of his 
hammering, not the hammer itself. Otto’s trust in 
his notebook is in part evidenced by the fact that he 
uses it transparently and unreflectively. However, in 
the case of self-regulative agency we are concerned 
not so with the fluent practice of skills but with the 
reflective evaluation of mental states. Artefacts that 
can be considered to extend this sort of mental 
activity might need to support the requirement for 
a degree of transparency-in-use which will allow 
fluid action, but they will also require a degree of 
reflective transparency which allow the central 
functions of reflection and self-regulation. A delicate 
balance may need to be achieved here where we 
are able to exhibit some degree of control over the 
type of transparency available in the appropriate 
circumstance. In general, this might be seen as a 
sort of limit on one version of the situated-embodied 
approach to persons. It is not enough for a strong 
agent to be always simply lost in engaged skilful 
practice. Sometimes is it necessary to reflect and 
to take a stance on one’s own mental life.
SECTION 5: CLOUD-TECH AND THE 
POSSIBILITY OF DOPPLEGANGERS
The interactive face of Internet technology 
has rapidly evolved from the static web-pages that 
we sat down at a desktop computer to consult, into a 
dynamic, ubiquitous and often highly personalized 
and adaptive technology –accessible from smart-
phone app, or an increasing variety of portable 
and wearable devices– that is the almost constant 
accompaniment of human life. This Cloud-Tech as I 
have called it, is the new hyper-mobile, personalized 
and interactive face of the Internet, animating an 
ever-increasing variety of mobile gadgetry and 
upon which an increasing range of our cognitive 
processes depend (Clowes, 2015b). Cloud-Tech is 
not so much a singular resource but a new order 
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of tools forming an ever-available informational 
background, or environment in which we think, 
act and live. From the 4E or ecological perspective 
(Hutchins, 2010), we can view the Internet as a 
new type of cognitive ecology (Smart, Heersmink, 
et al., 2017). But does the deep cognitive integration 
made possible by Cloud-Tech applications mean 
they should be viewed as exoselves, part of the 
substrate that makes us the persons we are, or else 
as doppelgangers: systems that we can come to 
depend upon as though they were person-extenders 
but may actually undermine our agentive integrity?
In concluding this article, I want to probe 
further how the convolved properties of Cloud-Tech 
can serve to seriously undermine the ability of some 
artefactual interactions to operate as exoselves. 
The individual properties are autonomy, social 
entanglement, personalization, and especially the 
reflective opacity we have already discussed. I shall 
briefly discuss each property along with some of 
the ways they interact. It is the conjunction of these 
properties which mean that the Internet, while being 
an apparently strong ground for the construction 
of exoselves, in actuality, also has very strong 
tendencies toward the generation of doppelgangers.
The first property I call autonomy but might 
also be thought of as automaticity. It refers to the 
growing tendency for Internet ICTs to incorporate 
AI technologies, such as the semantic web, deep 
learning technologies and a range of data-driven 
algorithmic systems which do not just present 
information to their users structure, guide and 
arguably manipulate user behaviour (Russell, 
2019). Such systems increasingly interact with each 
other as over-arching system in ways that can be 
very distant from direct human vigilance (Smart, 
Madaan, & Hall, 2018). Cloud-Tech systems are 
often highly autonomous in that the algorithmic 
mechanisms that underlie their operation are set-up 
to work independently from any direct human 
intervention and are often implemented through 
several types of artificial intelligence system. Such 
systems often attempt to shape, predict or nudge 
that user’s ongoing cognitive activity.
The specific nature of this autonomy in Cloud-
Tech systems is often highly related to the second 
property social entanglement. We can define Social 
Entanglement as the property of some artefactual 
systems such that the mechanisms by which they 
function are in part constituted by the interaction 
of multiple agents (Smart et al., 2018). The Internet 
has been highly socially entangled broadly since 
the advent of social media systems (Clowes, 2013, 
2014). It is this integration of a user’s actual social 
network into such systems that make possible the 
services they provide.
Consider again our hyper-connected tour-
guide Talia. Talia’s newsfeed, the lists of events, 
stories, and friends that she sees when she taps on 
the Facebook icon on her smart phone will all be 
different from what any of her friends see. This 
is because, Talia has a unique stored profile on 
those systems. Her newsfeed is populated by the 
unique data the system holds about her, including: 
her personal details, the history of her interactions 
with others through the system, information that 
has been mined and cross-referenced with other 
systems, categorized information on what type of 
stories she has previously shown interest, in and, 
information about which members of her social 
network she has previously spend time interacting 
with or simply shown interest in.
Such systems have an important cognitive 
dimension. Insofar as Talia relies upon socially 
entangled and autonomous social media systems 
such as Google Photos in order structure her 
recall of events such systems appear to be playing 
a constitutive role in her memory (Heersmink, 
2018). Apps such as Google Photos includes 
a function to “remember the day”. This might 
autonomously suggest looking at some photos 
taken five years ago on the same day of the year. 
However, the images autosuggested will tend to 
be those that have garnered attention previously, 
i.e., “liked” or otherwise interacted with either 
by the person who originally took the image, or, 
more likely, the larger social network of that user. 
Entanglement and autonomy can thus be seen as 
a sort of cognitive bias, or put differently, part of 
the new extended infrastructure of memory and 
recollection33. In fact, the user’s social network 
has become part of the cognitive system by which 
a given event is either recollected or forgotten. The 
socially entangled Internet thus not only changes 
the character of cognitive functions refracted 
through it but becomes part of the mechanism of 
a cognitive functions such as recall. Yet, this does 
not in itself alienate this system from Talia.
The algorithms: predictive systems and AI 
routines that populate Talia’s Facebook newsfeed 
are designed to –among other purposes– personalize 
the experience for her based upon her particular 
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history of interactions. We might consider that Talia 
has, in Sterelny’s terms, significantly individualized 
facebook –or a significant subset of its systems and 
functions– to herself. Insofar as she has heavily 
entrenched the usage of this personalized system 
by, for instance, keeping track of her friends and 
keeping up on local events, Talia’s use of Facebook, 
should therefore be a candidate as part of Talia's 
extended mind. In virtue of fulfilling the role of 
extending her narrative sense of self and who she 
is as a person, it should also count as an exoself. 
Yet there are reasons to question this interpretation.
Talia’s newsfeed may be indeed highly 
personalized to her in the sense that it is produced 
for her based upon a record of her unique interactive 
history. Yet, as Sterelny’s original examples suggest, 
a degree of voluntary or intentional customization 
may be required to play the role of individualization 
as originally conceived. A cook sharpens and hones 
his knives in a way that aids his particular cooking 
practice. Presumably he does so with the more or 
less conscious intention of facilitating cooking in a 
relevant way. The customization was conscious. This 
may or may not be the case with Talia’s use of social 
media systems and will depend on her patterns of 
interaction. Where the systems have autonomously 
and opaquely customized themselves to her in ways 
she has not noticed or cannot control her capacities 
for agentive self-regulation may be compromised. 
Moreover, Talia’s newsfeed is produced by algorithms 
which are highly socially entangled in the sense 
that what she sees is determined by invisible 
interactions with her broader social network and 
how that network interacts with Talia’s profile. This 
can produce another form of reflective opacity. The 
algorithms of Google Photos tag as important those 
that Talia’s friends have taken notice of and will later 
suggest that she “remembers the days”, i.e., direct 
her attention toward certain snaps made on that day 
of the year in the past, based upon the amount of 
network activity that a given image might garner. 
Such services are often autonomously provided 
by the system and is not something that Talia has 
necessary signed up to or has even the capacity to 
consciously reflected on.
In his paper on Distributed Cognition and 
Distributed Morality Richard Heersmink argues that 
we “should not interfere with people’s distributed 
minds and selves.” (Heersmink, 2016a). However, 
one problem with highly autonomous and entangled 
technologies, is that it may become difficult to 
manage and deal with one’s own set of distributed 
systems without , albeit unconsciously interfering 
with the minds and selves of others. In highly socially 
entangled systems, it might prove difficult for one 
user to interact with content which will subsequently 
be flagged for her attention through the system, 
without also (often unconsciously) triggering 
changes in how other users view and interact with 
their own content. Such unintentional effects appear 
to be the price of using complex, socially entangled 
algorithmic systems to structure what content we 
encounter through social media systems. Insofar as 
social networks provide some self-representing or 
self-structuring cognitive service, a certain degree 
of “interference” with the distributed minds and 
selves of others may be unavoidable. This raises 
the question of where and when social interaction 
becomes cognitive interference?
There is little doubt that internet applications 
can be used to intentionally bias the cognitive states 
of their users. This has recently been experimentally 
shown in one highly controversial recent study where 
alterations in a facebook algorithm has been shown 
to alter the mood of its users (Kramer, Guillory, 
& Hancock, 2014). Such experiments reveal the 
potential for regulating our emotional life when 
interventions are made with explicit intent, but it is 
already clear that any algorithm that controls what 
posts we are exposed to is having similar influences 
on our behaviour and emotional states. A degree 
of interference seems to be necessitated by these 
processes. The question is whether and when we 
should regard such interference as having negative 
impacts on the individual person or subject. Many 
Cloud-Tech systems already embody high degrees of 
autonomy, reflective opacity and social entanglement. 
These properties determine the characteristics of our 
interactions with many Internet systems.
As our vital and perhaps self-constituative 
cognitive systems come to depend upon such 
highly entangled social tools, we are hardly 
able to refrain from interfering in each other’s 
minds and selves. But this leaves unclear what 
importance we should give to the independence 
of our own cognitive processes. The real problem 
here, is with how technological systems can tend to 
render processes invisible that we need to be able 
to access, in order to regulate our mental states 
through distinctively human agentive practices. 
Where the inner workings of systems are made 
highly opaque it can become difficult for an agent 
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to gain a degree of cognitive control over what are 
putatively her own resources.
This returns us to a property that I call 
reflective opacity. Reflective opacity, as we have 
seen is the obverse of reflective transparency. It 
refers to our inability to easily discern or access the 
way that some mechanism, processing technology 
or algorithm works in order to produce its outcome. 
Interfaces to ICTs which are reflectively opaque 
do not allow their users to easily determine the 
algorithmic or mechanistic basis of how they work 
or indeed the reasons they work as they do. Very 
often, reflectively opaque technology may often 
be transparent-in-use although this relationship 
is not obviously necessitated. Insofar as an ICT is 
procedurally transparent but reflectively opaque, 
they may tempt us into deep interactions that may, 
in some circumstances undermine our own integrity.
The personalization of many social media 
systems makes use of large datasets and relies on 
algorithmic mechanisms that function according 
to principles and purposes which are typically not 
open to scrutiny (Clowes, 2013, 2015b). There 
could be several reasons for this. One might be 
that underlying algorithms are too complex to be 
easily understood. A second is that they may be 
proprietary and protected by (e.g.,) patents as they 
are the intellectual property of some corporation. 
A third (non-exclusive) reason is that the interface 
to a given technology may have been contrived 
in order to hide the manipulative nature of many 
algorithms that generate content on many Internet 
based applications34. From the point of view of 
the skilful action, such opacity is not necessary, 
and for at least certain purposes, might not even be 
desirable. Indeed the functioning of many systems 
is so opaque to their users that there is a little sense 
that we can easily track whether such systems are 
operating in our interests or not (Clowes, 2015b).35
The question of whether Internet based ICTs 
can ever be considered to extend us as persons turns 
on intuitions deriving from Bratman’s account of 
strong agency (discussed in the previous section). It 
is precisely when our cognitive processes are open 
to our  capacities to form judgments on them that 
we can incorporate them into us. Insofar as such 
processes become ever more obscured or determined 
by systems we neither understand nor control we 
lose those capacities to regulate ourselves with 
respect to those informational sources. Although 
the Internet can support the properties that would 
allow it to operate as an exoself, there are also deep 
tendencies towards the creation of doppelgangers36. 
Systems which are highly entangled, very autonomous 
and transparent enough that we neither notice their 
activities nor have the capacity to shape them, may 
be better regarded not as extending an agent, but 
rather act as outside influences on the agent’s will. 
Does this mean that the Internet technologies are 
more likely to create doppelgangers than extend 
us? Although the factors of social entanglement 
and autonomy are undoubtedly of great importance, 
it is our ability to regulate and take control of the 
technology which is the real limit on them acting 
as exoselves proper.
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NOTES
1 These are questions I and colleagues have considered in a series of publications (Clowes, 2013, 2015b, 2017, 2018b, 2018 
Online First; Smart, Clowes, et al., 2017; Smart, Heersmink, et al., 2017). I do here however return especially to the implications 
of ubiquitous Internet technology in the final sections of this paper.
2 Anders Sandberg traces the history of the term in his forthcoming article Post-Human Design: The Crafted Human Body 
and the Exoself (Sandberg, Forthcoming). Sandberg also defines the term exoself on his Transhumanist Website in the following 
way: “Systems linked to the self in a cooperative way, extending the mind and the body. Especially used about the systems su-
pporting an uploaded personality, providing information, virtual reality and monitoring.” https://www.aleph.se/Trans/Words/e.
html#EXOSELF
3 I will use the terms person and self somewhat interchangeably in this paper. The term self is notoriously ambiguous. 
Many theorists belief the term refers to many different systems coming online in human beings at different stages of developmental 
history (Neisser, 1988). The terms person is useful because there seems to be a little more rigger in its use.
4 It is worth emphasizing here that these three possibilities are not necessarily exclusive. For instance Turkle emphasizes in 
earlier work emphasizes how avatars can operate as an self-extensions (Turkle, 1985) and in more recent work how our avatar’s can 
act to constrain and limit us in various ways (Turkle, 2011). It is possible that a system might start our as being an avatar, become 
an exoself and then (because of some change in the algorithms underlying the system) function as a doppelganger.
5 See Schechtman (2012) for an argument of how the avatars that some people inhabit in online worlds should, in some 
circumstance, be considered part of the people through which they interact. In fact, it seems likely that online avatars and profiles 
are rapidly morphing into systems that regulate our lives in “real life”. Whether we should consider these systems proper parts of 
ourselves as individual agents, or as outside forces bringing us under their control is a question I will grapple with in this paper. 
Luciano Floridi (2014) has recently argued that the distinction between the online and virtual and offline is becoming of ever less 
practical relevance.
6 Although my primary example here is Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, which, because of its fame is likely better known to the 
reader, a more exact but less well known literary example is James Hogg’s 1824 Confessions of a Justified Sinner (Hogg, 2001). 
Mary Shelley’s 1818 Frankenstein can be seen as another (earlier) variation of the doppelganger. This theme which has deep roots 
in world literature.
7 Indeed, as I will argue below, some of the systems that constitute us human beings are as much a part of the social and 
technical niches we inhabit as parts of our brains and bodies.
8 For an illuminating discussion of self-narratives and the four properties mentioned see Persons and Personal Identity 
(Kind, 2015).
9 I discuss lifelogging systems extensively here (Clowes, 2013).
10 I have developed a –non-narrative– version of the socially situated approach to self with respect to philosophical psychiatry 
in several publications (Clowes, 2015a, 2018a; Clowes & Gärtner, 2018 Online First). My approach especially builds upon work 
analyzing some compromise to the sense of self that takes place in early schizophrenia (Lysaker & Lysaker, 2008). This view turns 
on the idea that at least some part of our pre-reflective sense of self is given through the ability to attune to social situations.
11 The sense of personal injury here is perhaps more closely connected to the old Marxist idea that workers cannot truly be 
liberated until they own the means of production.
12 For a detailed investigation of these sort of processes around the practices of a potter at the wheel see Malafouris (2008).
13 It is worth noting the differences between Clark’s MamboBot and Sandberg’s use of Wikipedia in his writing. The Mambot 
is more active and autonomous, finding and feeding information that effects its user’s choices in the background of consciousness. 
It has also been (albeit passively) highly customized to its user and some of his cognitive capabilities have come to rely upon it. 
Sandberg may not notice he is constantly accessing the web as part of his writing activity but his use of the system is more active 
and potentially open to consciousness.
14 While using the term pre-reflective sense of self (Sartre, 1967) here I do not intend it to be understood in quite the tra-
ditional sense of a thin, or essentially contentless form of pre-reflective self-awareness which as recently and influencially been 
developed by Dan Zahavi (Zahavi, 2005, 2017). Rather the notion I have in mind is of a somewhat thicker but still pre-reflective 
sense of self that might be grounded in the notions of habit, skills or a pre-reflective but immersed sense of oneself as an inhabitant 
of customary social situations (Clowes & Gärtner, 2018 Online First).
15 The concept of strong agency –sometimes known as temporally extended agency– was originally developed by Michael 
Bratman (2000). I have recently developed account of the artefactual dependence of strong agency and especially its relationship 
to Internet mediated ICTs in (Clowes, 2019). I discuss the concept of strong agency and its relationship to personhood in (Clowes, 
2020).
16 Sandberg is clearly aware that such systems may not however just promote ‘virtue’, for he immediately goes on to write 
that such regulative systems “can easily backfire when the full existential and social context is not taken into account.”
17 As a sort of reference point here we might think of here of Oliver Sacks patient William Thompson or as Sacks dubs 
him, “The Lost Mariner” (Sacks, 1985). Mr. Thompson was a patient with Korsakoff syndrome. One striking thing about this 
compromise to his narrative sense of self was that until pushed the patient did not realize his deficits. Our unconscious minds are 
inveterate confabulators, forever filling in, missing details. There remains the possibility then that just because we do not notice 
compromise to our narrative sense of self, when we are lose connection to our distributed media, there might nevertheless be a 
compromise.
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18 There is some debate here about if he were to move to China. Long-term residence under a censorious regime might indeed 
prevent him from looking at his photo-albums, if they were stored on google. He might also worry that some of his projects were 
being surveilled by the Chinese State and therefore refrain from using them.
19 A further complicating factor is whether these different factors of personhood might in fact reduce to fewer underlying 
factors. Unfortunately this question goes beyond the scope of this paper but the curious reader might investigate a related line of 
thought here (Ward, 2019).
20 In fact, in the original paper there were four criteria, Trust being described in terms of Automatic Endorsement as des-
cribed in the main body of the text and Past Endorsement, namely that “the information in the notebook has been consciously 
endorsed at some point in the past, and indeed is there as a consequence of this endorsement.” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998). The 
criteria as expressed here follow the Clark (2010, p. 53) presentation of these ideas and the discussion in Smart, Clowes, et al. 
(2017, pp. 52-53).
21 The term scaffolding can sometimes cause confusion because it suggests a scaffold is something which is used to construct 
a particular skill and can then be discarded. Indeed the literature in cognitive science was first used to indicate supports for skill 
development in an approach to developmental psychology (Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976). However, although there seems to be 
some influence here this is not the use of the term that Sterelny seems to suppose. For Sterelny a scaffold is a cognitive support 
that does not only set up a skill but has enduring potency in its maintenance and use.
22 See Heersmink (2015a) for a detailed treatment of some of the factors that might effect whether we see any given artefact 
to agent liaison as counting as part of the agent’s mind as opposed to “merely” counting as part of that agent’s cognitively potent 
environment.
23 See Clowes (2015b) for a more detailed discussion of these themes.
24 For further discussion of the informational and procedural transparency the reader should refer to (Heersmink, 2015a; 
Heersmink & Sutton, 2018). However, I do not use quite the same terminology in this paper, and instead mainly continue to use the 
term transparency-in-use (Clowes, 2013) in a way that subsumes Heersmink’s procedural transparency but also does not exclude 
informational aspects. I am not convinced procedural transparency can be easily distinguished from informational transparency in 
many practical contexts. An ICT interface might incorporate both formal and practical aspects in its design and transparency-in-use 
requires being fluent with both insofar as they are separable. There may be contexts in which it is helpful to decompose these and 
contexts where it is not. In the next section I discuss how these factors of transparency-in-use should be contrasted with what I 
call reflective transparency.
25 Unfortunately a full analysis of this dimensional approach goes beyond the scope of this paper, but for a extended analysis 
using its terms, see (Smart, Clowes, et al., 2017, pp. 65-69)
26 Arguably there is a sticking point here. Cloud Otto is not in fact receiving some crucial information from his device 
namely that it is no longer updating its list of destinations in the way he expects. Nevertheless, there is quite a bit of bi-directional 
information flow in this example. Cloud-Otto smart phone is continually updating the WeGo database about Cloud Otto’s current 
location and the app is reciprocally receiving information updated information about how to reach his “chosen” destination and 
various services he could avail himself of along the way. The crucial point here is that there is plenty of mutual information flow, 
but it is just now relevant to the sorts of cognitive vigilance a epistemically careful agent should want to be able to access.
27 For a lucid related discussion of transparency in relation to the mechanisms of consciousness and human evolution the 
reader is referred to (Metzinger, 2004, p. 61).
28 This point relates to some recent discussion over epistemic agency. Palermos notes that “in order for a process to be a 
candidate for inclusion to the agent’s conscientious cognitive character, we noted it will probably have to be neither strange nor 
fleeting. (1) will have to be normal so that the agent won’t reject it when conscientious and (2) will have to be a disposition or a 
habit of the agent.” (Palermos, 2014, p. 1943). For Cloud-Otto it seems that these sorts of fleeting cognitive episodes are occasioned 
by his interaction with the We-Go app. Any standing believes about his destination for the day are at the mercy of the crowd of 
users of WeGo.
29 There is a relevant discussion of procedural transparency and representational transparency in Heersmink’s (2015a) 
paper on the Dimensions of integration in embedded and extended cognitive systems. I have also discussed some related issues in 
(Clowes, 2013)
30 See Andrada (2019) for a detailed discussion on whether and how this problem might be resolved.
31 See (Andrada, Forthcoming) for a framework that analyses the interplay between organic capabilities, technologies and 
the sociocultural environment in which the interaction takes place.
32 Albeit this question is not uncontroversial; see discussion in (Clowes, 2017; Michaelian, 2012).
33 I am using the term bias here in a value-neutral way to mean something that effects or changes the character of a given 
cognitive process. This could be for the better, worse or be not easily assessed along a single evaluative dimension.
34 A good account of some of the way that AI technologies are being used to shape human decision architecture see (Russell, 
2019).
35 In personal communication, Paul Smart points out that even the designers may not be aware of how some contemporary 
complex systems work, hence the interest in Explicable Artificial Intelligence.
36 There are somewhat contradictory trends at work in the development of many contemporary ICT systems. On the one 
hand there is a growing trend toward self-tracking, i.e., the development of the quantified-self movement focused upon increasing 
“self-knowledge” in ways that depend upon the visualization of the data being generated by a variety of mobile devices as well 
as our interactions with a variety of Internet technologies (Bode & Kristensen; Lupton, 2016; Swan, 2013). The contrary trend 
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however is the growing tendency towards obscuring the computational bases–both in terms of data held on us by major online 
companies, and the actual algorithms that process this data–of computational systems run by the big companies such Facebook, 
Google, Amazon. Insofar as systems that might be part of our exoselves embody block reflective transparency, they will tend to 
undermine our regulative agency. The incorporation of very reflectively opaque cognitive systems tends to make us all look more 
like Cloud-Otto.
